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OKLAHOMA PERPETUITIES AND SUCH
By Garrett Logan*
I
INTRODUCTION
The right to dispose of property is not absolute.
It long has been and still is the law that sound public policy
requires the free transferability of property and frowns on its
withdrawal from the channels of commerce. To effectuate that
policy, court decisions and legislative enactments have imposed
restrictions on the right of disposition.
These have to do with time periods within which estates
must vest, or options must be exercised, and beyond which
income of trusts may not be accumulated; the time during
which the absolute power of alienation may be suspended;
and some restraints on alienation are prohibited. In a broad
sense, all these constitute the rule against perpetuities. In a
strict sense, the rule concerns only the time within which
estates must vest, sometimes referred to as the rule against
remoteness of vesting.1
Invalidity may be the result of violation of the restrictions.
Perpetuities and kindred problems may lurk in any form
*Of the Tulsa County Bar.
1 According to Phillips v. Chambers, 174 Okla. 407, 51 P.2d
303 (1935), followed in Le Force v. Bullard, 454 P.2d 297
(Okla. 1969), the rule in the broad sense includes restric-
tions as to (1) remoteness of vesting, (2) restraints on
alienation, and (3) suspension of alienation, and (1) is the
rule in the strict sense.
1
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of property disposition, including wills, deeds, options and
trusts. They often are present in dispositions to a class (such
as issue, children, grandchildren, nieces and nephews) in which
the individual takers are not designated by name, and a pre-
ceding estate or interest is created; or in dispositions to named
persons on attaining stated ages; or in options with no limit on
the time in which they may be exercised; or in trust provisions
for the accumulation of income; or in instances in which the
estate created is of such a nature that there are not existing
persons who by joining together may convey the entire title;
or in prohibitions against alienation by donee or grantee. The
enumeration is not all-inclusive.
Oklahoma perpetuities law has had the attention of emin-
ent writers.2 The last comprehensive article was written in
1953.
Decisions of the Supreme Court of Oklahoma during the
last eighteen years seem to warrant a current look at Okla-
homa law and to require revision of some earlier views. Among
other decisions, MeZcher v. Camp,4 decided in 1967, has had a
marked impact, furnishes answers to several previously un-
settled questions, and well may be a landmark case.
This article discusses the law of Oklahoma concerning the
rule against perpetuities in the broad sense, with these exclu-
sions: business trusts, charitable trusts; pension, retirement
2 RESTATEmENT OF PRoPERTY, Div. IV, appendix following
§ 449, ch. B, § 66-71 (1944); id., special note 3, at 2135-36(1944); 6 AwEPCAw LAW OF PRoPERTY, § 25.77-81 (1952);
Kuntz, The Rule Against Perpetuities and Mineral Interests,
8 OKLA. L. REv. 183 (1955) (discussing among other cases,
Francis v. Superior Oil Co., 102 F.2d 732 (10th Cir. 1939).
8 Browder, Perpetuities in Oklahoma, 6 OxiA. L. REV. 1
(1953). Several questions raised by Browder are answered
by the later cases.
4 435 P.2d 107 (Okla. 1967).
2
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and profit-sharing plans, and trusts for the furtherance of
public functions.5
The format will consist in a statement of general rules and
consideration in detail of numerous cases. References to author-
ities elsewhere are not encyclopedic.
n
THE RULE AGAINST REMOTENESS OF VESTING
1. Source and Separate Nature
The Oklahoma Constitution declares "Perpetuities . . .
are contrary to the genius of a free government and shall
never be allowed .... ,,6
An Oklahoma statute provides "The common law, as
modified by constitutional and statutory law, judicial decisions
and the condition and wants of the people, shall remain in
force in aid of the general Statutes of Oklahoma .... ,,7
5 For statutory treatment of the excluded subjects, see
OKLA. STAT. tit. 60, § 172 (1961) (business trusts limited
to 21 years or period of life or lives in being at creation
of the trust); id., § 175.47 (1961) (no limit on suspension
of power of alienation for charitable trusts); id., § 176 et
seq. (1961) (trusts for furtherance of public functions may
exist for term of duration of the beneficiary); id., § § 326, 327
(1961) (pension, retirement and profit-sharing plans not
construed to violate perpetuities rules or restraints on
alienation); OKLA. STAT. tit. 62, § 651 et seq. (1961) (Local
Industrial Development Act, public trusts authorized).
6 OKLA. CONST. art. 2, § 32. This section has been a ground
for decisions that perpetual franchises cannot be granted
to public utilities. See, e.g., City of Okmulgee v. Okmulgee
Gas Co., 140 Okla. 88, 282 P. 640 (1930) (and several com-
panion cases); Hawks v. Hamill, 288 U. S. 52 (1930).
7 OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 2 (1961). Although a part of the
chapter on civil procedure, this statute is effective in per-
petuities situations. Phillips v. Chambers, 174 Okla. 407,
51 P.2d 303 (1935).
19711
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The common law rule against remoteness of vesting has
always been in force in this State.
In the early case of McLaughlin v. Yingings, the court
said: "It seems clear that the statute, supra, is declaratory of
the rule at common law", but no pertinent statute is cited any-
where in the opinion.
Scholars and some courts have opined that some of the
1890 statutes on real property, particularly those with refer-
ence to suspension of the power of alienation, and a section
of the Oklahoma Trust Act as to suspension of the power of
alienation, 10 are statutes on perpetuities and made effective
in Oklahoma the common law rule as to remoteness of vest-
ing." This at least impliedly posed the question of whether
the statutes modify the rule.
Melcher v. Camp12 requires revision of these views. It
teaches that the common law rule as to remoteness of vesting
is in force by virtue of statutes concerning suspension of the
power of alienation; that the mention of statute in McLaughlin
was inadvertent and was in fact a reference to the Constitu-
tion; and that rules as to suspension of the power of alienation
are entirely separate from the rule against perpetuities, al-
though associated with it.
The case was decided "upon the application of the common
s 90 Okla. 159, 213 P. 552 (1923).
9 OKLA. STAT. tit. 60, § 21-43 (1961); id., §§ 237, 238.
10 OKLA. STAT. tit. 60, § 175.47 (1961).
"Authorities cited supra, notes 2 and 3; Morgan v. Griffith
Realty Co., 192 F.2d 597, (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S.
934 (1951); In re Walker's Estate, 179 Okla. 442, 66 P.2d 88(1937); Phillips v. Chambers, 174 Okla. 407, 51 P.2d 303(1935). The dissenting opinion in Malone v. Herndon, 197
Okla. 26, 168 P.2d 272, 279-80 (1946), states the statutes
supercede or modify the common law rule. Browder, supra,
note 3 was concerned about the question.
12 435 P.2d 107 (Okla. 1967).
4
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law rule . . . in its classical meaning." The court found that
rule "extant in this State from ratification of Art. 2, Sec. 32,
Oklahoma Constitution."'13
All this is of more than academic interest. It definitely
establishes which rule is in force. It excludes statutory modifi-
cation of the rule. It means invalidity may arise out of viola-
tion of the rule against remoteness of vesting or out of viola-
tion of the rule against suspension of the power of alienation.
Later discussion will point out other clarifications of the
law which emanate from the decision.
2. The General Rule As To Time Periods For Vesting
Barnes v. Barnes,14 says:
The rule against perpetuities is usually stated as
prohibiting the creation of future interests or estates
which by possibility may not become vested within a
life or lives then in being plus twenty-one years, to-
gether with the period of gestation when the inclusion
of the latter is necessary to cover cases of posthumous
birth .... Such rule, however, is concerned only with
the remoteness of vesting of contingent future interests
and not with their duration or termination... 'A vest-
ed interest does not necessarily include a right to the
possession, and if an interest is vested it is not subject
to the rule, however remote may be the time when it
may come into possession.'
Other Oklahoma cases are substantially to the same
effect.'5
Melcher v. Camp,16 which, as previously noted, holds the
common law rule is in force in Oklahoma, states the rule in
two parts, with a different time period for each part, thus:
No interest is good unless it must vest, if at all,
13 Id. at 112.
14 280 P.2d 996, 999 (Okla. 1955).
15 E.g., In re Walker's Estate, 179 Okla. 442, 66 P.2d 88 (1937).
16 435 P.2d 107 (Okla. 1967).
19711
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not later than twenty-one years after some life in
being at the creation of the interest.17
and
Apart from a resort to lives in being as the
standard for measuring the period of time for the post-
ponement of the vesting of a future estate, the only
definite period permitted... is a term not exceeding
21 years.18
Notwithstanding the statement in the McLaughlin case
above quoted in Melcher, and perhaps because of the then view
that the Oklahoma rule might be based on statutes, there was
doubt of existence of a period "in gross" apart from a life or
lives in being situation. 9 Melcher removes that doubt. There
is a period in gross.
Now, according to Barnes,20 the period of gestation may be
added to the "lives in being plus 21 years." In Meicher, al-
though not mentioned in the opinion, such a period is included
in a syllabus by the court, which becomes a part of Oklahoma
law, although not necessary to the decision.12 Its inclusion
in that syllabus and in Barnes is in accord with usual state-
ments of the rule.22
Furthermore, Oklahoma statutes on wills and on contracts
provide that a child conceived, but not born, is deemed to be
an existing person so far as may be necessary for its interest
17 Id. at 111, quoting GRAY, TnE RU= AGAINST PERPETUTES,
191 (4th ed. 1942).
18 Id. at 111, quoting McLaughlin v. Yingling, 90 Okla. 159,
170, 213 P. 552, 564 (1923).
19 For example, see Browder, supra note 3, at 6; Kuntz, supra
note 2, at 184.
20 280 P.2d at 999.
21 City of Altus v. Martin, 268 P.2d 228, 234 (Okla. 1954).
22 RESTATEmENT OF PROPERTY, § 374 (1944); 6 AwEc LAW
OF PRoPERTY, § 24.12-.15 (1952).
6
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in the event of its subsequent birth, and appear to be codifica-
tions of the common law.23
The conclusion must be that the period of gestation may
be tacked on to the twenty-one years after a life or lives in
being.
Yet to be decided squarely is whether the rule against
remoteness of vesting applies in all events to personal property.
Melcher seems to say the rule applies to personality, "especial-
ly where there is a relationship between the personal property
and some real property interest."24 Some earlier cases, ruling
that OKLA. STAT. tit. 60, § 175.47 (1961) was a perpetuities
statute, indicate, by way of dictum, that the rule applies to
personality.25 In other cases, both realty and personality were
involved, but there was no decision on the precise point here
discussed.28
3. The Duration of Trusts.
Whether the rule against remoteness of vesting fixes the
maximum term or duration of a trust, if all interests vest
within the prescribed period, is an open question.
OKLA. STAT. tit. 60, § 172, limiting the duration of trusts
to twenty-one years or the period of the life or lives of the
beneficiary or beneficiaries in being at the creation of the
trust, was enacted in 191927 The adoption of The Oklahoma
23 OKLA. STAT. tit 84, § 173 (1961); OKLA. STAT. tit. 15, § 15
(1961).
24 435 P.2d at 112.
25 Morgan v. Griffith Realty Co., 192 F.2d 597 (10th Cir.), cert.
denied, 343 U.S. 934 (1951); Greenshields v. Warren Pet.
Corp., 248 F.2d 61 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 907
(1957). The statute mentions both realty and personalty,
but applies only to trusts and is not a perpetuities statute
(Melcher), so the dicta are not persuasive.
28 E.g., McLaughlin v. Yingling, 90 Okla. 159, 213 P.2d 552
(1923); Barnes v. Barnes, 280 P.2d 996 (Okla. 1955).
27 Law of March 22, 1919, ch. 16 (1919) OKLA. SEss. LAw: 30.
19711
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Trust Act in 1941,28 by implication repealed it as to personal
trusts.29 A 1949 amendment provides the section shall apply
only to business trusts.30
Pre-1941 decisions, insofar as they are based on the statute
in its original form, are to be construed accordingly. However,
those decisions and the statute as first enacted govern the dur-
ation of presently existing trusts which became effective prior
to enactment of The Oklahoma Trust Act.81
There is now no Oklahoma statute expressly fixing the
maximum term or duration of a personal trust.3 2
It has been said elsewhere, but not without dissent, that
a trust is not invalid under the common law rule against per-
petuities merely because its duration may exceed lives in being
and twenty-one years if all interests vest within that period.83
28 OKLA. STAT. tit. 60, § 131 et seq.
29 See Barnes v. Barnes, 280 P.2d 996, 1000 (Okla. 1955).
30 Law of May 31, 1949, tit. 60, ch. 4 § 1 (1949) OKLA. SESS.
LAWS 412.
31 Smith v. Smith, 336 P.2d 355 (Okla. 1959); Cf. Franklin v.
Margay Oil Corp., 194 Okla. 519, 153 P.2d 486 (1944) (as
to vested rights). See generally OKLA. STAT. tit. 60 § 175.33
(1961) (applicability of The Oklahoma Trust Act to trusts
existing at the time of its enactment).
32. According to Melcher v. Camp, 435 P.2d 107 (1967), OxLA.
STAT. tit. 60, § § 31, 34 (1961) do not apply to trusts and
although § 175.47 does apply to trusts, it is not a per-
petuities statute. Further, as later discussed, the fangs of
175.47 may be drawn by conferring upon the trustee a
power of sale. Pipkin v. Pipkin, 370 P.2d 826 (Okla. 1962).
Some earlier views which disagree with the textual state-
ment did not have the benefit of Meicher and Pipkin. See
RESTATEmEm OF PROPERTY, Appendix, ch. B, Sec. 71 fol. Sec.
449 (1944); 6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, § 25.78 (1952).
33 RESTATEMiENT OF TRUSTS (SECOND), Appendix, Sec. 62, com-
ment n at 135 (1957); I SCOTT ON TRUSTS, § 62.10 at 543 (2d
ed. 1956); BOGERT, TRusTs Am TRuSTEES, § 218 (2d ed. 1965);
McClary v. McClary, 134 F.2d 455; (10th Cir. 1943) (Texas
law applied).
8
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Even if all interests are vested, considerations of public
policy could result in a court-imposed limit on duration. 4 The
Oklahoma Supreme Court has not dealt with the question
apart from interpreting Section 172, which is no longer appli-
cable. General statements, as in Barnes, that the rule against
perpetuities is concerned with vesting and not with duration
or termination of estates are not deemed to be decisive. The
court has also observed that a perpetual trust cannot be
created. 5
Until The Supreme Court of Oklahoma rules on the pre-
cise point, it may be wise draftmanship to provide for termin-
ation of a trust not later than lives in being plus twenty-one
years.
4. Absolute Vesting Required
To satisfy the rule, estates or interests must vest absolutely
and unconditionally within the prescribed period. A vesting
which may re-open to let in those born after expiration of the
period does not meet the rule's requirement.386
Further, it is not enough that the interest may vest within
the prescribed period, if there is a possibility of a later
vesting.
The rule must be applied even if there is a pos-
sibility that the estate would vest beyond the period
14 Such a holding might be based on the rule against per-
petuities or the broader concept of "social restrictions"
which is usually keyed to the time period of the rule against
perpetuities. BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES, § 218 at 560-64
(2d ed. 1965); 4 RESTATEmENT OF PROPERTY, Div. IV at
2119 (1944). Smith v. Smith, 336 P.2d 355, 363 (Okla. 1959)
(Observes that a will provision for continuance of admin-
istration proceedings for a long period, such as 30 years,
might be against public policy.) See also I ScoTT ON TRUSTS,
§ 62.10 at 544 (2d ed. 1956).
35 Smith v. Smith, 336 P.2d 355 (Okla. 1959).
86 McLaughlin v. Yingling, 90 Okla. 159, 213 P. 552 (1923).
19713
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prescribed by the rule; and probabilities or improba-
bilities of the time of such future vesting are unim-
portant and immaterial. If under any possible contin-
gency which may arise the vesting of the future estate
will take place beyond the life of one in being at the
date of testator's death, plus twenty-one years, the
attempted conveyance or disposition is void. 7
Obviously, the decision as to validity is to be made as of
the date of the disposition and not as of some later date. This
must mean that the "wait and see" doctrine, which permits
consideration of an actual vesting at or before the time of the
trial or a postponement of decision until the time of vesting
may be determined,38 is no part of Oklahoma law.
A trustee's power of sale may create a contingency in some
respects, but does not prevent absolute vesting.89
5. Lives In Being
The Supreme Court of Oklahoma has not had occasion to
explore fully the "life or lives in being" concept. Authorities
elsewhere are in agreement as to general principles. Measuring
lives must be indicated in the instrument, but need not be
pointed out specifically. They may be designated however, and
need not be those who take any interest in the property, sub-
ject to the limitation that they must be neither so numerous
nor so situated that evidence of their deaths is likely to be
unreasonably difficult to obtain.40
87 In re Walker's Estate, 179 Okla. 442, 66 P.2d 88 (1937).
See also Melcher v. Camp, 435 P.2d 107 (Okla. 1967);
Barnes v. Barnes, 280 P.2d 996 (Okla. 1955) ("by possibil-
ity"); McLaughlin v. Yingling, 90 Okla. 159, 213 P. 552
(1923).
88 For a more complete statement of the doctrine, see BOGERT,
TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES, § 213 at 484-86 (2d Ed. 1965).
89 Franklin v. Margay Oil Corp., 194 Okla. 519, 153 P.2d 486
(1944).
40 6 AmaCAN LAw OF PROPERTY, § 24.13 (1952); RESTATmEm
OF PROPERTY, § 374, comment 1 (1944); 70 C.J.S. Perpetuities
§ 4 (b) at 579 (1951).
10
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6. Strict or Liberal Construction?
According to McLaughlin,41 the instrument is to be con-
strued as if the rule against remoteness of vesting did not
exist, "and then ...apply the rule rigorously, in complete
disregard of the wishes and intentions of the testator or grant-
or .. .although to do so violates the testator's intention as
determined by the court." And also: "The rule against perpet-
uities is not a rule of construction, but a positive mandate of
law, to be obeyed irrespective of the question of intention."42
In re Street's Estate,43 the court was not impressed or per-
suaded by arguments as to what the testator had in mind.
Significantly, Meicher relies heavily on McLaughlin, omits
mention of numerous earlier cases, and reiterates by quotation
McLaughlin's statement that the rule against perpetuities is
not a rule of construction, but a positive mandate of law, to
be obeyed irrespective of the question of intention. It re-
fused to follow Weber v. Texas Co.,45 which appears to have
applied a liberal construction rule.46
However, these cases do not tell the whole story. As above
noted, the first order of business is to construe the document
as if the perpetuities rule did not exist (although often done
with a weather eye on the perpetuities problem). Here, within
narrow limits, liberality is permitted by the cases. Their basic
premise: the cardinal rule is to ascertain and give effect to
intent, if the intent does not attempt to effect what the law
forbids, so a construction resulting in validity must be pre-
ferred to one resulting in invalidity.47
41 90 Okla. 159, 213 P. 552 (1923).
42 Id. at 564. There are similar statements in Morgan v. Griffith
Realty Co., 192 F.2d 597, cert. denied, 343 U.S. 934 (1951).
43 138 Okla. 115, 280 P. 413 (1929).
44 435 P.2d at 111.
45 83 F. 2d 807 (5th Cir. 1936).
46 435 P. 2d at 115.
47 This is a statutory general rule as to wills and contracts.
OKLA. STAT. tit. 84, § 151, et seq. (1961), which received short
shrift in In re Street's Estate, 138 Okla. 115, 280 P. 413 (1929);
OIIA. STAT. tit. 15, § 159 (1961).
19711
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Testator created a trust to pay income to seven named
beneficiaries. If any of them died without issue, the property
was to be divided among the survivors at the end of twenty-
five years, but if any died with issue his or her share should
go to such issue at the end of twenty-five years. There was a
possibility all of the seven might die within a year or so after
testator died, and so the 25 year period might be more than
lives in being plus twenty-one years. That contingency, said
the court, never occurred to the testator, was not provided
for, should it occur the trust would terminate as a matter of
law, and so the will was valid. Without spelling out the reason,
the court ruled that its construction rendered McLaughlin and
other cases inapplicable. 48 Of this, more anon.
A different situation was presented in Barnes v. Barnes.49
An undivided interest in testator's property was devised to
Lee G. Barnes, "Lee G. Barnes share to be held in trust by
Louie T. Barnes and paid to him Fifty Dollars per month until
all his share is paid." The will was silent as to disposition on
Lee's death. Invalidity was urged on the ground that if Lee's
interest did not vest immediately there was nothing to indicate
when, if ever, it would vest, and the trust must continue
throughout all eternity in violation of the rule against perpet-
uities. Not so, said the court. If Lee died before receiving all
his share of the estate, the purpose of the trust ceased and it
terminated by operation of law, and in any event the trust
terminated at his death. The Cunningham case was cited as
authority. Further, the decision was that Lee's interest was
vested and only the right to possession was postponed.
48 Cunningham v. Fidelity Nat. Bank, 186 Okla. 429, 98 P.2d 57
(1940). Munger v. Elliott, 187 Okla. 19, 100 P.2d 876 (1940)
follows this case, although the only asserted ground of in-
validity was "suspension of alienation". Further, apart from
the "cardinal rule", intent may be a factor in the "rule of
convenience." See In re Walker's Estate, 179 Okla. 442, 66
P.2d 88 (1937) (discussed infra, subdivision 7).
49 280 P.2d 996 (1955).
12
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In Smith v. Smith,50 testator gave to a son and a daughter
1/6th each of the net income from his estate, with a "reverter"
clause that in the event either or both died "such sixth interest
to revert to the surviving member or members of my family,"
but if none survived, to nearest blood relations. The court ob-
served that if the reverter clause applied to the income interest
only there was no limit on the length of time during which
the income interest could be separated from the right to pos-
session, and further "if property is devised to one person, but
charged with the duty of paying a fractional part of the income
to another," an express trust was created, the duration of which
was limited by OKLA. STAT. tit. 60, § 172 (1961).51 The court
found ambiguity as to whether the testator intended the re-
verter clause to apply to the income interest only, the result
of which would be invalidity, or to the fee interest, the result
of which would be validity. It resolved the ambiguity in favor
of validity.
From these cases, two rules of construction may be de-
duced. One is strict and the other is liberal to a limited extent.
The rule against remoteness of vesting must be rigorously
applied if the document shows on its face that the creator of
the interest obviously envisioned and by clear language pro-
vided for an invalidating contingency or for vesting at too
remote a date. Intent is disregarded. That is McLaughlin, Street
and Meicher.
On the other hand, the doctrine of preferential construc-
tion in favor of validity may be applied if the instrument is
silent concerning an invalidatng contigency, or the possibility
of vesting at too remote a date, or if there is ambiguity. Intent
is recognized unless it would give effect to what the law
forbids. That is Cunningham, Barns and Smith.
50 336 P.2d 355 (Okla. 1959).
51 Id at 360-61.
19711
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Smith v. Smith 2 states the rule in a slightly different
form:
Thus, if under one construction a bequest would
become an illegal perpetuity while under another con-
struction it would be valid and operative, the latter
mode must be preferred. But when the language of
the provisions of a will is plain and unambiguous,
courts are not permitted to wrest it from its natural
import in order to save it from condemnation.5 3
Thus the Oklahoma cases may live together in harmony.
They preclude court revision of express language, such as
cutting back to 21 years a period stated to be more than 21
years, in order to avoid invalidity.5 4
7. Applications of the Rule-
Time of Vesting
A number of cases concern gifts to a class on termina-
tion of a preceding particular estate or interest, such as, for
example, a life estate. Several Oklahoma wills statutes are per-
tinent.55 It may be said generally that there is validity only
52 336 P.2d 335 (Okla. 1959).
53 Id. at 361, quoting, 57 Am. Jum. Wills, § 1126 (1948).
54 See Carter v. Berry, 243 Miss. 356, 140 So. 2d 843, 95 A.L.R.2d
791 (1962) (especially subdivision III of the opinion, which
in effect rewrites the instrument by reducing a longer per-
iod to 21 years).
16 OKLA. STAT. tit. 84, §§ 170, 171, 175 (1961) provide as follows:
Sec. 170: Words in a will referring to death or survivor-
ship, simply, relate to the time of the testator's death,
unless possession is actually postponed, when they must
be referred to the time of possession.
Sec. 171: A testamentary disposition to a class includes
every person answering the description at the testator's
death, but when the possession is postponed to a future
period, it includes also all the persons coming within the
description before the time to which the possession is
postponed.
Sec. 175: Testamentary dispositions, including devises
14
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if the class closes, i. e., all its members can be ascertained,
not later than 21 years after some life in being at the crea-
tion of the interest, plus the period of gestation.
The Cunningham, Barnes, and Smith cases are analyzed
in subdivision 6, supra.
In McLaughlin v. Yingling,5 6 a will provided that on
termination of preceding interests and if testator's daughter
died without issue, the residue should go to nieces and
nephews as a class, not to take effect until the youngest ar-
rived at age twenty-two. That was one year too many. Fur-
ther, testator's father survived and there was a possibility of
birth of children to him, who in turn might have children who
would attain age twenty-two later than a period of lives in
being plus twenty-one years. The court ruled that even if
there was any vesting prior to distribution it was not absolute
but defeasible, not satisfying the rule's requirement, that the
interests vested absolutely only at the time for distribution,
and the disposition was invalid in its entirety. Note that the
class did not close within the prescribed period. There was
no mention of the wills statutes above set out.
In re Street's Estate,57 the devise was to trustee to pay
income to the widow and children, on their death to grand-
and bequests to a person on attaining majority, are
presumed to vest at the testator's death.
Absent postponing language, devises and bequests vest
in the devisees and legatees immediately on testator's
death, subject to probate court control for the purposes
of administration, and may be conveyed or transferred
immediately. Ware v. Beach, 322 P.2d 635, cert. denied,
358 U.S. 819 (1958); Ward v. Okla. Tax Comm., 322 P.2d
172, 176 (1957); Parks v. Lefeber, 162 Okla. 265, 20 P.2d
179 (1933); Cf. Landy v. First Nat'l. Bank, 368 P.2d 987
(Okla. 1962); OKLA. STAT. tit. 58, § 644 (1961).
5 90 Okla. 159, 213 P. 552 (1923).
57 138 Okla. 115, 280 P. 413 (1929).
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children, and when all grandchildren had died, the property
was to be sold and the proceeds divided among their heirs.
Among other statutes, what is now OxLA. STAT. tit. 84, § 171
(1961) was quoted. The court said, with reference to final
disposition, there was a class susceptible of unborn additions.
It cited statutes on suspension of the power of alienation, the
duration of trusts, and as well the McLaughlin case. This
devise seems to run head on into the prohibitions of all three.
The exact ground of decision is not clear. The court finally
concluded "said provision is void as offending the rule against
perpetuities."118 It impliedly, but necessarily, held that vest-
ing ocurred at the time for distribution.
Devises, in trust or otherwise, to one for life, remainder
to the issue of the life tenant, or if there be none, remainder
to issue of the life tenant's sisters, are valid. If the life
tenant leaves no issue and even if his sisters survive him,
the remainder vests in the sister's issue as they were at the
life tenant's death. (Of course, if the life tenant left issue,
the remainder vested in them at his death). Issue born to
the sisters after the life tenant's death would be excluded.
So held in In re Walker's Estate.59 The court said:
This was in accordance with the spirit if not the
letter of... [Okla. Stat. tit. 84 § § 170, 171 (1961)] and
the well established rule of law that if a contrary in-
tention does not clearly appear, an interest will always
58 Id. at 118, 280 P. at 415.
51 179 Okla. 442, 66 P.2d 88 (1937). In a deed from a wife to
her husband to hold for the duration of their marriage and
then to go to the wife's children or the children of any de-
ceased child, the remainder vested in the children on the
husband's death and there was no violation of the rule
against perpetuities. Beatty v. Miley, 204 Okla. 634, 233 P.2d
269 (1951). There is a remark, obiter, in Hein v. Hein, 431
P.2d 316, 320 (Okla. 1967) that in the devise of a life estate
to a son, remainder to his children, the remainder vests at
the testator's death and not at the life tenant's death. The
rule against perpetuities was not involved.
[Vol. 7, N1o. 1
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be construed to vest at the earliest possible time
consistent with the testator's intention.0
At first blush, this may appear to be contrary to other
expositions of the rule against remoteness of vesting. Yet,
although the court did not mention it, the "rule of conven-
ience" supports its decision. One statement of the rule is
the "justification for excluding the later born . . . is that
otherwise the distribution which was directed to take effect
at A's death would have to be postponed, since it would be
impossible to ascertain how many persons might become
members of the class thereafter."61 Observe, also, that on
the life tenant's death possession should, as a practical matter,
vest in someone. That would have to be the issue of the sis-
ters in being at the life tenant's death. In that view, OKLA.
STAT. tit. 84, §§ 170, 171 (1961) would not cause postpone-
ment of the time for closing the class. Regardless of all
this, the decision is correct. All testator's children were "lives
in being" and even if the remainder vested at the sisters'
deaths the vesting would be not later than twenty-one years
after lives in being.
Malone v. Herndon,62 has to do with a different situa-
tion. In pertinent part, the will gave a life estate to Wayne
Lee Maxwell under a trust and directed that if he died with
issue the trust estate should be "paid over, delivered and
conveyed to such issue living at the time of said payment,
delivery or conveyance." In a terse paragraph the court
held the will did not violate the rule against perpetuities
and did not extend the trust after Wayne's death, but only
provided who should receive it at the time of "payment,
delivery and conveyance." There was a vigorous dissent.
0 179 Okla. at 448, 66 P.2d at 95.
61 I ScoTt, TRUSTS, § 127.4 at 926 (2d ed. 1956). See also 5
Azi=cA LAw OF PROPERTY, § 22.41 (1952); BonnaT, TRUSTS
AND ThusmEs, § 182 at 224 (2d ed. 1965); RESTATEmEnT OF
PRoPERTY, § 295 (1944).
62 197 Okla. 26, 168 P.2d 272 (1946).
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It is arguable that between Wayne's death and the time for
payment there might by death be changes in those who
constituted "issue" and vesting could not occur until time
for payment. By possibility, the time of payment could be
after expiration of lives in being plus twenty-one years.
That may be a bit far-fetched, but it could occur. Elsewhere,
there is a conflict of authority as to whether a gift or trust
to vest or take effect on probate of a will, or on the dis-
tribution of an estate, violates the remote vesting rule.0
The decision in Franklin v. Margay Oil Corp. 64 rests
upon interpretation of OKLA. STAT. tit. 60, § 172 (1961) pre-
viously considered and § 175.47, prohibiting suspension of
the absolute power of alienation for a longer period than
during the life or lives of beneficiaries of the trust in being
at its creation and twenty-one years thereafter. It holds valid
a trust for the benefit of a widow for life, daugher for life,
with remainder to the issue of the daughter. At the date of
trial, the daughter had one child. The decision was that the
remainder vested in that child, subject to be re-opened to let
in after-born children, and that the interests vested immedi-
ately on testator's death. Of course the class would close on
the daughter's death. In any event, there would be a vesting
within lives in being and 21 years, so the common law rule
would not be violated. It is reasonable to suppose Franklin
may be authority in cases involving the rule against remote-
ness of vesting.
There is a paucity of Oklahoma authority as to the time
of vesting of distributions to be made or to become effective
at attained ages, whether to a class or to named individuals.
McLaughlin, above considered, where the disposition was to
a class, seems to be the only case in which the rule against
6 BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEMS, § 213 at 477 (2d ed. 1965)
(collects some cases going both ways, and indicates the
modern view favors validity.)
4 194 Okla. 519, 153 P.2d 486 (1944).
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remoteness of vesting was applied. It holds vesting occurs
only at the time of distribution, that is, upon attainment of
the stated age. In Munger v. Elfiott, 5 there was a trust to
continue until the youngest grandchild should reach the age
of twenty-one years. Both parties conceded there was no
vesting prior to termination of the trust. The case turned
on "suspension of alienation" rather than the rule against
remoteness of vesting.
Two other cases are of interest, although in neither of
them was the rule against remoteness of vesting raised or
considered. A conveyance in trust until the youngest of
grantor's named children arrive at age 18, at which time
the property should go to the surviving children, but if none,
to the grantee, created an interest contingent on survivorship
which did not vest until the youngest child attained age
eighteen.(6  A testamentary trust for named persons provid-
ing that as each arrives at age thirty-five, and not before,
his portion shall be transferred, but if he dies before re-
ceiving it and leaves lineal descendants the trust is to con-
tinue until they arrive at age thirty-five, creates only a con-
tingent interest in the named beneficiaries. 7
In these cases, income apparently was not payable to
the beneficiaries before they reached the specified age. Had
it been so payable, that might indicate vesting before the
age was reached. Also, much depends on the exact language
of the instrument which in some instances may constitute an
absolute and immediate gift with only a postponement of
enjoyment.68
65 187 Okla. 19, 100 P.2d 876 (1940).
6 O'Connor v. Arnold, 155 Okla. 295, 9 P.2d 25 (1932).
67 Crews v. Oven, 159 F.2d 780 (10th Cir. 1947). It is interesting
to speculate on the result had the perpetuities question been
presented. A life in being plus more than 21 years?
68 II ScoTT, TRUSTS, § 128.8 at 958 (2d ed. 1956); RESTATETENT
oF PROPERTY, § 258, comments a, c, f and h (1944). Annot.
155 A.L.R. 698 (1945).
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About all that can be said now is that such dispositions
appear to vest only on attainment of the specified age, but
there may be further development of Oklahoma law on the
subject.
The rule against remoteness of vesting applies to the time
within which options are to be exercised, with one possible
exception.
A lease covenant granting an option for perpetual renewal
is valid because, it is said, the covenant to renew constitutes
a part of the lessee's present interest and, insofar as questions
of remoteness are concerned the estate for years with right
to renew is substantially a fee.09 So considered, this may not
be an exception to the rule.
In Melcher v. Camp,7" an oil and gas lease was granted
covering the upper 5500 feet of certain described property. A
separate agreement between lessors (first parties) and lessee
(second party) provided:
The parties further mutually agree that in the
event first parties shall at any time have an opportun-
ity to lease the oil, gas and other mineral rights below
5500 feet, second party is to be given a five day option
of acquiring such lease himself on the same terms and
conditions offered to first parties.71
Analyzing this option, the opinion declares the only connec-
tions between the lease on the upper 5500 feet and the con-
templated lease below 5500 feet are that the premises are
vertically contiguous and each requires use of a portion of the
surface for exploration; the contemplated lease would not be a
renewal of the lease on the upper 5500 feet, but would be
another lease for exploration of different premises (this dis-
69 Tipton v. North, 185 Okla. 365, 92 P.2d 364 (1939), followed
in Wallace v. Williams, 313 P.2d 784 (Okla. 1957).
70 435 P.2d 107 (Okla. 1957).
71 Id. at 109.
[Vol. 7, No. I
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poses of Tipton v. North,2 not mentioned in the opinion); and
the option pertained to a time which might never occur. The
effect of the option was to fetter first parties' right to sell a
lease to whomever they might choose. Acknowledging that
merely personal contracts are not subject to the rule against
perpetuities, the court held that provisions for acquisition of
future leases are within the rule, and that a contract for an
ordinary oil and gas lease to vest in futuro creates an interest
in reality sufficient to invoke it. Declaring that the common
law rule against remoteness of vesting is in force in this State,
the court decided the option was void as a violation of that
rule. It refused to limit the decision to so-called pre-emptive
options such as the one involved in this case and said "ordi-
nary options" were included in its condemnation. And so an
option without limit as to the time for its exercise is void.
Morgan v. Griffith Realty Co.73 is cited with approval in
Melcher. The repurchase option was exercisable if the grantee
abandoned its intention to construct a theatre on the property.
"And the abandonment of that intention might never take
place", so the option was void as a violation of the rule against
perpetuities.
Greenshields v. Warren Petroleum Corp.7 4 must suffer a
different fate. A contract for sale of natural gas to be produced
from certain described lands included the grant of an option,
unlimited as to the time for its exercise, to purchase gas to be
produced from after-acquired properties. Although recognizing
that this granted an interest in the after-acquired leases, the
court held it did not violate the rule against perpetuities. Pre-
cedents in point were not cited. With all due respect, the
Court's reasoning is faulty. The citation of Section 399, Re-
72 185 Okla. 365, 92 P.2d 364 (1939).
73 192 F.2d 597 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 934 (1951).
74 248 F.2d 61 (10th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 907 (1957).
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statement of Property5 seems to be inept, since the seller in
the gas contract, at the time of its execution, owned no inter-
est in the property to be subsequently acquired. And almost
certainly the case cannot survive Melcher.
8. Consequences of Violation
of the Rule.
Transgression! What are the consequences under Okla-
homa law?
Invalidity has been adjudged in just four cases- Mc-
Laughlin, Street, Morgan, and Melcher. These few cases fur-
nish only a few answers.
A disposition is in violation of the rule against remoteness
if vesting is void. The four cases agree on this.
A void codicil leaves the original will in force.7 6
By implication only, a void option is deleted without
affecting validity of other portions of a deed or contract.77
75 REsTATEMENT OF PROPERTY, § 399 (1944) provides:
When the limitation of an easement, or the attempt-
ed creation of an interest in land by covenant, is not
within one of the rules stated in Secs. 370 ... 371 ...
and 394 (option to repurchase reserved to conveyor),
then the attempted interest in land is not invalid under
the rule against perpetuities, even though
(a) it can continue for a period longer than the maxi-
mum period described in Sec. 374; and
(b) it can result in the acquisition of property or the
payment of one or more sums of money on the occur-
ence of events not certain to occur within the maximum
period described in Sec. 374.
76 In re Street's Estate, 138 Okla. 115, 280 P. 413 (1929).
77 Morgan v. Griffith Realty Co., 192 F.2d 597 (10th Cir.),
cert. denied, 343 U.S. 934 (1951), in which two documents
executed substantially at the same time were considered
together. In Melcher v. Camp, 435 P.2d 107 (Okla. 1967),
the lease and option concerned separate properties. Appar-
ently, the validity of the lease was conceded by all parties.
[Vol. 7, No. 1
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McLaughlin v. Yingling,78 is not very helpful. The widow
attacked the will on the grounds that paragraph 8 - a bequest
to nieces and nephews, not to take effect until the youngest
arrived at the age of 22 years - was void, and that the will
attempted to convey away from her more than two-thirds of
the estate (which was contrary to the "forced heir" statute
then in force). The appeal was from a judgment in three cases
which had been consolidated in the district court, two of them
being appeals from the county court and the third being a
case originally filed in the district court. In one of the county
court cases, by both findings of fact and conclusions of law,
the court declared that paragraph 8 offended the rule against
perpetuities, that the elimination of that paragraph destroyed
the general scheme of testator's disposal of his estate and
therefore the entire will failed.79 The Oklahoma Supreme Court
did not rule on this point. It said that paragraph 8 did offend
the rule against perpetuities, ". . . but we think the will is
absolutely void as to the surviving wife ... in that it bequeaths
more than two-thirds of his property away from the wife...
which is prohibited by the" forced heir statute.
And that is about all of the Oklahoma law on the conse-
quences of violating the rule against remoteness of vesting.
78 90 Okla. 159, 213 P. 552 (1923).
79 The forced heir statute limits the quantum of property one
spouse may will away from the other. The exact amount
has been changed by amendment from time to time. The
present statute is OKLA. STAT. tit. 84, § 44 (1961). If the
limit is exceeded, the surviving spouse takes under the law
of intestate succession, absent an election to take under
the will. If no such election, will provisions for the sur-
viving spouse are in effect deleted, but all other portions
of the will remain in force unless the deletion destroys
the manifest plan of the testator for disposition of his
estate. Not to chase the rabbit too far, see Bank of Com-
merce v. Trigg, 138 Okla. 216, 280 P. 563 (1929); In re
Walker's Estate, 179 Okla. 442, 66 P.2d 88 (1937); Long v.
Drumright, 375 P.2d 953 (Okla. 1962).
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I
TRUSTS FOR ACCUMULATIONS
OF INCOME
It is not unusual for trusts to require or permit accumula-
tions for various periods of time, with payment over at a
later date or dates. Conceivably, the rule against perpetui-
ties or some kindred rule might impose time limits on the
accumulations.
If the analysis which follows is correct, in Oklahoma the
entire subject is covered by statutes which are almost unique.
What the law may be elsewhere need not be considered.
The pertinent statutes are OKLA. STAT. tit. 60, §§ 175.23E,
175.25 (1961).80
Section 175.23E authorizes a court to relieve a trustee
from duties and restrictions which would otherwise be placed
upon him by the Trust Act. Section 175.25 covers spendthrift
trusts and related matters, including trust income. A case
indirectly involving time limits for the accumulation of in-
comes is of substantial import as to origin and construction of
these statutes.
In First National Bank of Enid v. Clark8l the trial court
ordered a trustee to pay to plaintiff accrued and accruing
child support money "out of the first income hereafter to
said trust estate", the debtor being De Albert Lewis. The
trust authorized the trustee, in its uncontrolled discretion,
to pay to Lewis, out of income and corpus, such sums as it
saw fit for his benefit; at his death such discretionary pay-
ments were to be made to his sons, at whose death the trust
was to terminate and any remaining estate was to be dis-
tributed to named charities. The Trustee had not allotted
80 The ensuing discussion states the substance of the statutes,
hence they are not here set out at length.
81 402 P.2d 248 (Okla. 1965).
[Vol. 7, No. I
24
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 7 [1971], Iss. 1, Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol7/iss1/2
OKLAHOMA PERPETUITIES
any income to Lewis. The decision of the trial court was
reversed because the secondary beneficiaries and remainder-
men were not made parties.
The court noted that Section 175.25 is not a part of the
Uniform Trust Act but was taken from a Louisiana statute82
which had not been construed in that state, and that au-
thorities from other jurisdictions and decisions under the
Uniform Act were of "little assistance." It pointed out that
if income was not used for Lewis' benefit, a greater sum
would be available for the sons or the residuary beneficiaries.
Of course, that has to do with accumulation of income. It
also found that involved here was both a spendthrift trust
and a discretionary trust. Finally, the court ruled that any
income the trustee allotted to Lewis could be taken to satisfy
the judgment, and clearly held that in a proceeding with
proper parties, the court might require the trustee to make
income available, referring to Section 175.23E. It is therefore
apparent that in Oklahoma a trustee may be required to
disgorge income rather than accumulate, even though the
instrument itself gives him discretion in that regard.
Under Section 175.25 the trust may be discretionary, or
it may require payment of income to the beneficiary or
beneficiaries.
In a discretionary trust, the provisions of the Act apply
to any sums the trustee (or other person who may exercise
discretion) determines shall be paid to or for the beneficiary
(Subparagraph E).
If the trust requires payment of income to the bene-
ficiaries, all of it is subject to claims for support of a hus-
band, wife or child of the beneficiary and necessary services
or supplies furnished the beneficiary.83 In other cases, in-
come in excess of $5,000.00 per year is subject to creditor's
82 LA. REV. STAT. ANN. App., § 9 (1923).
83 OKLA. STAT. tit. 60, § 175.25 (A) (1) (1961).
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claims and is alienable by the beneficiary, 4 and the aggre-
gate of all income under all trusts is to be considered in
determining the rights of creditors and assignees.85 Thus no
provision for accumulation of income will be effective against
the claims mentioned in Section 175.25 (A) (1), but except
for such claims, total accumulations of $5,000.00 annually
are permitted under one or more trusts for one beneficiary,
and any provision for accumulations of more than $5,000.00
is unenforceable as to the excess.
These further conclusions as to Oklahoma law may be
drawn from the cited statutes and Clark.""
1. The statutes declare the public policy of the State
and make inapplicable common law rules and the reasoning
on which they are based. It may even be said the statutes
recognize the validity of criticism of such rules and rea-
soning.
2. In an appropriate proceeding, a court may modify or
change trust provisions of the nature here considered.
3. The statutory scheme is complete. It imposes no time
limits on accumulations of income and none should be implied.
Court proceedings under Section 175.23E are a sufficient
safety valve.
One small dragon ramains.
OXLA. STAT. tit. 60 140 (1961) provides:
Where a trust is created to receive the rents
and profits of real property, and no valid direction for
accumulation is given, the surplus of such rents and
profits, beyond the sum that may be n e c e s s a r y
for the education and support of the person for
whose benefit the trust is created, is liable to the
84 Id. § 175.25 (A) (2).
85 Id., § 175.25 (C).
86 402 P.2d 248 (Okla. 1965).
[Vol. 7, No. 1
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claims of the creditors of such person, in the same
manner as personal property which cannot be reached
by execution.
The correct view is that this section was repealed by
The Oklahoma Trust Act, and particularly by Section 175.25. 87
Even if it was not, the words "and no valid direction for
accumulation is given" force resort to Section 175.25 and the
practical result is the same as if the section had been re-
pealed.
IV
FETTERS ON ALIENATION
Under this heading two separate rules as to fetters on
alienation will be considered. They are (1) the rule against
suspension of the power of alienation and (2) restraints on
alienation.
The power of alienation is suspended if the estate cre-
ated is of such a nature that there are not at all times
persons in being who by joining can convey the fee or abso-
lute title.88 There is a restraint on alienation if the instru-
ment conveying or creating vested interests contains prohibi-
tions against their disposition by the donee or grantee.
And of these in their order.
1. Suspension of the
Power of Alienation
Several sctions of Title 60, OKLA. STAT. (1961) have to
do with suspension of the power of alienation.
Section 31, enacted in 1890:
The absolute power of alienation cannot be sus-
pended by any limitation or condition whatever, for
87 See Comment, Trusts, Spendthrift Trusts in Oklahoma, 14
OKLA. L. REv. 233 (1961); BOGART, TRUSTS A TRusTEs, §
222 at 661 (2d ed. 1965).
88 See Tipton v. North, 185 Okla. 365, 92 P.2d 364, 368 (1939).
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a longer period than during the continuance of the
lives of persons in being at the creation of the limita-
tion or condition, except as provided in Section... 34.
Section 34, enacted in 1890:
A contingent remainder in fee may be created
on a prior remainder in fee, to take effect in the
event that the persons to whom the first remainder
is limited die under the age of twenty-one years, or
upon any other contingency by which the estate of
such persons may be determined before they attain
majority.
These two sections are in the chapter on estates in real prop-
erty. Other statutes have some bearing.8 9
Section 175.47, enacted in 1941 as part of The Oklahoma
Trust Act, in pertinent part:
The absolute power of alienation of real and
personal property, or either of them, shall not be
suspended by any limitations or conditions whatever
for a longer period than during the continuance of a
life or lives of the beneficiaries in being at the cre-
ation of the estate and twenty-one years thereafter
These statutes and the rule against remoteness of vest-
ing differ in material respects. Time periods are not identical.
Section 175.47 the measuring lives are limited to the life
or lives of the beneficiaries in being at the creation of the
estate. However, vesting of interests is of consequence In
both statutes and the rule.
89 OKLA. STAT. tit. 60, § 237 (1961):
The period during which the absolute right of aliena-
tion may be suspended by an instrument in execution
of a power, must be computed, not from the date of the
instrument, but from the time of the creation of the
power. id.,
Sec. 238 (1961):
No estate or interest can be given or limited to any
person, by an instrument in execution of a power, which
could not have been given or limited at the time of the
creation of the power.
[Vol. 7, No. I
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The fields for the operation of these statutes are, for
the first time, clearly delineated in Melcher v. Camp.90 Sec-
tion 31 relates only to real property interests. Section 175.47
covers both realty and personalty, applies only to trusts,
and repeals Section 31 insofar as trusts are concerned, so
since 1941 Section 31 has not been applicable to trusts. It
should follow that Section 33,91 an explanation or definition
of the language of Section 31, has been repealed, although
that Section is not mentioned in Melcher.
From all this, a logical deduction is that there is no statute
as to suspension of the power of alienation of personalty
not held in trust. Whether there may be a court-imposed
limit on the grounds of public policy is for future decision.
There is no suspension of the power of alienation if
there are at all times in being persons who by joining can
convey the fee.
So a perpetual lease, or a lease with a covenant for per-
petual renewal does not suspend the power of alienation.92
The landlord and tenant, by joining, can convey the fee.
"The absolute ownership of a term of years cannot be
suspended for a longer period than the absolute power of
alienation can be suspended in respect of a fee."98
A testamentary trust directed payment of income to
testator's son and to the children of a deceased son, the trust
to continue until the youngest child of the deceased son
90 435 P.2d 107 (Okla. 1967).
91 OKLA. STAT. tit. 60, § 33 (1961):
The suspension of all power to alienate the subject of
the trust, other than a power to exchange it for other
property to be held upon the same trust, or to sell it and
reinvest the proceeds to be held under the same trust,
is a suspension of the power of alienation within the
meaning of the second preceding section.
92 Tipton v. North, 185 Ola. 365, 92 P.2d 364 (1932).
93 OKLA. STAT. tit. 60 § 32 (1961).
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reached the age of twenty-one years, with final distribution
to the son and "to my grandchildren living," and so on,
mentioning "my grandchildren" several times. The coten-
tion was that the trust was in violation of OiKA. STAT. tit.
60, §§ 31, 32, 33 (1961) because "my grandchildren" in-
cluded children who might be later born to the son. Follow-
ing the "cardinal rule" of Cunningham,9 4 the court held that
testator did not contemplate the possibility of children be-
ing born to the surviving son, and did not attempt to pro-
vide for them, but only for the children of the deceased
son. The children of the latter were in being at testator's
death and the youngest would attain age 21 within the
statutory period, hence the trust was valid. The decision
is correct and is supported by a later case that an ambiguity
will be resolved in favor of validity 0
A devise to testator's children of undivided interests in
a life estate, with remainder in fee limited on each of the
interests to the surviving issue of each tenant for life, but
if none, over in fee to testator's surviving children, creates
contingent remainders and a valid suspension of the power
of alienation.90 The court said:
A remainder in fee limited to the children or
the heirs of the life tenant's body, though such heirs
be unborn at the time of the grant, is recognized by
statute as a valid grant. Sec. 11766, O.S. 1931, 60 Old.
St. Ann. § 41. A remainder made contingent upon the
failure of such heirs cannot vest until such failure
becomes a settled fact. The latter is a contingent
remainder and may not vest until failure of surviv-
ing issue of the life tenant becomes certain. Sec.
04 186 Okla. 429, 98 P.2d 57 (1940).
95 Munger v. Elliott, 187 Okla. 19, 100 P.2d 876 (1940). The
later case is Smith v. Smith, 336 P.2d 355 (Okla. 1959) (Dis-
cussed supra II, subd. 6).
90 Waldon v. Baker, 184 Okla. 492, 88 P.2d 352 (1939). Com-
pare the facts here with those in In re Walker's Estate, 179
Okla. 442, 66 P. 2d 88 (1937) (Discussed supra II, subd. 7).
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11759, 0. S. 1931, 60 Old. St. Ann. § 34. Through the
fee simple title is never in abeyance, the power of
alienation may be suspended in the manner above
stated. Sec. 11756, O.S. 1931, 60 Okl. St. Ann. § 31;
See. 11759, supra. The will in the instant case ac-
complished that end. As to each of the testator's
children and his or her particular life interest, the
remainder in fee limited upon each of said interests
to their respective surviving issue, and over to the
other of said children in default of such issue, was
not in any event a vested remainder, but suspended
the power of alienation in any manner that would
tend to deprive potential remaindermen of their rights
under the grant.9
7
Perhaps any interest or estate in realty permitted or au-
thorized by OKLA. STAT. tit. 60, §§ 21 et seq. (1961) does not
involve an invalid suspension of the power of alienation. That
seems to be the end result of the decision.
Of the several cases discussed in Section H, supra, Frank-
lin v. Margay Oil Corp.9 8 hold not only that the r u 1 e
against remoteness of vesting was not violated, but also
that there was no invalid suspension of the power of aliena-
tion. In re Street's Estate o10 may hold there was an invalid
suspension, although the grounds for the decision are not
clear. The facts in these cases are set out in the preceding
discussion.
Insofar as trusts are concerned, the 1962 decision in Pip-
kin v. PipkinT10 makes an important contribution to the
law. Mentioning Section 31 of the statutes, but not Section
175.47, the decision is that no suspension of alienation results
from a trust which confers upon the trustee an absolute
power of sale. This was prior to Melcher's ruling that Sec-
17 184 Okla. at 494, 88 P.2d at 354.
98 194 Okla. 519, 153 P.2d 486 (1944).
99 280 P.2d 996 (1955).
100 138 Okla. 115, 280 P. 413 (1929).
101 370 P.2d 826 (Okla. 1962).
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tion 175.47 and not Section 31 governs as to trusts, but the
reasoning is applicable to both statutes. Each piece of prop-
erty held in trust is freely transferable and is not withdrawn
from the channels of commerce in that it is alienable under
the power of sale, and so also as to the proceeds to be held
in trust. That should satisfy public policy requirements. 10 2
Note that Section 33 of the statutes, previously mentioned,
must be considered as repealed by The Oklahoma Trust Act.
If not, Pipkin makes it inapplicable. As might be expected,
some decisions in other jurisdictions are contrary to the
Pipkin doctrine.103 Pipkin is basically sound.
Suppose a trust does not confer upon the trustee a power
of sale, but neither does it expressly or impliedly prohibit
sale. In these circumstances a section of The Oklahoma Trust
Act 0M authorizes the trustee "to sell real or personal property
at public auction or at private sale for cash, or upon credit
secured by lien upon the property sold . . . ." Is Pipkin
applicable? If it is, very little is left for Section 175.47 to
chew on.
The case is criticized, I think unjustly, by one writer.10 5
102 Emphasizing free transferability, a power of sale may in-
clude the power to convey lesser interests. Franklin v.
Margay Oil Corp., 194 Okla. 519, 153 P.2d 486 (1944);
(oil or gas lease) Parks v. Central Life Assurance Society,
181 Okla. 638, 75 P. 2d 1111 (1938) (mortgage). Since
adoption of The Oklahoma Trust Act in 1941, in the absence
of contrary or limiting provisions in the trust agreement,
or an order of court, the trustee has broad powers of dis-
position, including sale. OKLA. STAT. tit. 60, § 175.24 (1961).
103 See discussion, BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES, § 219 at 587-89
(2d ed. 1965).
104 OKLA. STAT. tit. 60, § 175.24B (1961).
105 Note, 17 OKLA. L. REv. 438 (1964), (admits a "proper re-
sult" was reached). If, as charged, Pipkin sins in speaking
of restraints on alienation instead of suspension of the
power of alienation, it is one of a crowd which blurs the
terminology. See Cunningham v. Fidelity National Bank,
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Neither contingent remainders or irrevocable trusts are
destructible by action or consent of those who, at the time,
hold all present but not all future interests in the property.10 6
In such instances there are not persons in being who by
joining can convey the fee or the entire interest.
A somewhat inconsequential exception may exist under
a statute concerning the revocation of trusts.10 7 The interest
which a beneficiary takes by descent has been broadly con-
strued. For example, it applies to interests under a pro-
vision for distribution to a named person on attaining a
stated age, but if he sooner dies, as appointed by his will,
or if no will, to his issue, but if no will and no issue, to
trustors' heirs at law.08 By its terms, the statute permits
revocation only during the lifetime of the trustor. The pro-
vision as to spendthrift trusts has been virtually eliminated
by the decisions.
186 Okla. 429, 98 P.2d 57 (1940), and Tipton v. North, 185
Okla. 365, 92 P.2d 364 (1939) as examples. It is also strange
to fault the Court, as the writer does, for failure to write
a treatise on questions which it doubtless thought were not
necessary to its decision.
100 Browder, Perpetuities in Oklahoma, 6 OKLA. L. REv. 1, 8
(1953); 6 019A. L. Rav. 103 (1953); 2 OKIA. L. REV. 514
(1949); Hill v. Hill, 49 Okla. 424, 152 P.1122 (1915), subse-
quent opinion, 54 Okla. 441, 153 P. 1185 (1916).
107 OKLA. STAT. tit. 60, § 175.41 (1961):
Any trust may be revoked by the trustor upon the writ-
ten consent of all living persons having vested or con-
tingent interest therein. The term "contingent interest",
as used in this Section, shall include an interest which
a beneficiary may take by purchase, and exclude any
interest which a beneficiary may take by descent. Pro-
vided further that this Section shall not apply to a
spendthrift trust unless same is created by the trustor
for his own benefit.
108 Hurst v. Kravis, 333 P.2d 314 (Okla. 1958); Hurst v. Taub-
man, 275 P.2d 877 (Okla. 1954); Dunnett v. First National
Bank & Trust Co. of Tulsa, 184 Okla. 82, 85 P.2d 281 (1938).
See also Atchison v. Dietrich, 315 P.2d 265 (Okla. 1957).
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In some circumstances, in the exercise of its general
equitable powers, a court may order a sale of property in
which there are contingent interests, including interests of
the unborn as well as the living, with the proceeds to be
held for distribution under court order.1 9 Later-enacted
statutes are to the same effect." 0 Do you want to conjure
with that? Power of sale? Destructibility?
2. Restraints on Alienation
With some exceptions, the restraint of alienation of a
vested interest or a legal estate in fee, though to continue
for a limited time, is void. Only the restraint is invalid. The
document of transfer remains in force in all other respects.
Statutes are said to be the basis for Oklahoma law on
this subject."' The chapter on interpretation of contracts
states that particular clauses of a contract are subject to
its general intent, repugnancy must be reconciled, if pos-
sible, and words which are wholly inconsistent with the
nature of the contract or with the main intention of the
parties are to be rejected." 2 These statutes appear to be
nothing more than codifications of common law rules. There
may be room for resort to the common law should the need
arise.
Stone v. Easter"3 rejected as inoperative this provision
in a deed to realty:
Provided, that said second party shall not sell,
transfer or alienate said premises until she has at-
tained the age of forty (40) years.
109 Whitten v. Whitten, 203 Okla. 196, 219 P.2d 228 (1950).
110 OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 1147.1 et seq. (1961).
I" Berry v. Cooley, 188 Okla. 426, 428, 109 P.2d. 1081, 1084
(1941): "Regardless of what the common law on the sub-
ject may be, present day decisions . . . are based upon
statutes . .. .
112 OKLA. STAT. tit. 15, §§ 166, 168, 169 (1961).
Is 93 Okla. 68, 219 P. 653 (1923).
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The Court refused to make any distinction between an
unqualified restraint and one for a limited time, said con-
veyance of the fee was wholly incompatible with the re-
straint, and observed there were no apt words making the
estate conveyed either defeasible or conditional. Among
other authorities, the statutes on interpretation of contracts
were cited.
It is within the realm of possibility that the scrivener
of a later deed was aware of Easter's comments about lack
of apt words making the estate either defeasible or condi-
tional. A deed was written with this clause:
Provided, the land described herein shall not
be sold or in any way incumbered for the period
of fifteen years from this date, and in case any at-
tempt to sell or in any way incumber, or suffer the
same to be done, the title shall revert to the grantor
or his heirs or assigns.
In ensuing litigation, Easter was cited and the provision was
ruled to be void.114
Also, where a testamentary trust in effect conveyed to
trustees the absolute title to realty, wholly ineffectual was
a direction that the trustees were not to sell or dispose of
the land until such time as "it is clearly demonstrated that
there is no oil or gas in or under said lands.""15
Berry v. Cooley" 6 may stand as an exception, or the
basis for an exception, to the foregoing rules. Three docu-
ments were involved: a property settlement between husband
and wife, a deed from husband to wife, and a decree of
divorce. The first provided the husband should convey realty
to the wife in full settlement of the wife's claims for alimony
and support money, but if the wife should remarry, the realty
should become the property of the children, and there were
14 Crookum v. Ketchum, 174 Okla. 468, 50 P.2d 710 (1935).
"5 Riley v. Collier, 111 Okla. 130, 238 P. 491 (1925).
16 188 Okla. 426, 109 P.2d 1081 (1941).
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restraints on alienation by the wife. The contract was set
out in full in the divorce decree and approved by the court
and the wife was enjoined from encumbering or disposing
of the land in any manner contrary to the agreement. The
husband executed a quitclaim deed to the wife, reference
being made to the settlement agreement and divorce decree.
Question: were the restraints on alienation by the wife en-
forceable? The court said "Yes". The decision is clearly
correct. The reasoning which led to it is interesting. Limita-
tion on the grant to the wife in favor of the children was
not repugnant to the contract of conveyance or the intention
of the parties. The court gave effect to all the provisions
of all the documents involved. Very well. But referring to
Easter and Crookum, the court said they:
are based upon deeds where the grantor by the pur-
ported restriction was not attempting to fulfill a legal
duty resting upon him. The restriction . . . was in-
serted merely at the whim, caprice or personal choice
of the grantor and not in the performance of a legal
obligation. 117
And there may be the exception.
There may be another exception which permits a re-
striction against conveyance to a designated person or per-
haps to a class. Several Oklahoma cases sustain covenants
in a plat or deed that the property shall not be conveyed to
persons of African descent.11 8 These were knocked out by
a decision of the Supreme Court of the United States on
constitutional grounds.11 9 If that objection is surmounted,
117 Id. at 428, 109 P.2d at 1084.
118 Lyons v. Wallen, 191 Okla. 567, 133 P.2d 555 (1943) ; Hems-
ley v. Sage, 194 Okla. 669, 154 P.2d 577 (1945); Schwartz v.
Hubbard, 198 Okla. 194, 177 P.2d 117 (1947); Hawkins v.
Whayne, 198 Okla. 400, 179 P.2d 138 (1947).
119 Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 68 S. Ct. 836, 92 L. Ed. 1161
(1947).
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it may be that a restriction against conveyance to a desig-
nated individual or individuals, or perhaps even to a class,
is valid.
The Oklahoma Trust Act authorizes some restraints on
alienation by the beneficiaries of a trust.
To a limited extent, an income beneficiary may be re-
strained from disposing of trust income. See Section III,
supra, "Trusts for Accumulations of Income."
There are other permissible restrictions concerning prin-
cipal.
OKLA. STAT. tit. 60, § 175.25D (1961):
The right of any beneficiary of a trust to re-
ceive the principal of the trust or any part of it, pre-
sently or in the future, shall not be alienable and
shall not be subject to the claims of his creditors.
if there is appropriate language in the trust instrument.
Such restraints will be enforced by the courts.120
No Oklahoma case has been found which decides whether,
aside from restrictions on trust beneficiaries, these rules are
applicable to personalty dispositions.
V
CONCLUSION
In the last several years Oklahoma law as to perpetuities
and kindred subjects has been clarified in important respects.
120 Keaton v. Stephenson, 206 Okla. 32, 240 P.2d 1088 (1952)
(restraint on alienation of income); Frensley v. Frensley,
177 Okla. 221, 58 P.2d 307 (1936) (construing statutes in
force before enactment of The Oklahoma Trust Act.). Cf.
First National Bank of Enid v. Clark, 402 P.2d 248 (Okla.
1965) (discussed in III, supra).
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However, numerous questions have not been answered and
remain for future decision, including:
1. Does the rule against remoteness of vesting
apply in all events to personality?
2. Does the rule against remoteness of vesting
fix the maximum duration of a trust if all intersts
vest within the prescribed period, and if it does not,
may there be a court-imposed time limit?
3. What is the full extent of the "life or lives
in being" concept?
4. When does a disposition to named persons on
attaining specified ages vest?
5. To what extent does violation of the rules
invalidate the document of transfer?
6. Is there any prohibition against suspension of
the power of alienation of personality not held in
trust?
7. Does a trustee's statutory power of sale render
inapplicable the rule as to suspension of the power
of alienation?
8. Are there circumstances under which there
may be a valid restraint on alienation to designated
persons, or perhaps to a class?
9. Is the rule as to restraints on alienation ap-
plicable to personality not held in trust?
10. Are trusts for accumulation of income gov-
erned solely by statute?
The curious may find in this article other unans-
wered questions. And certainly there may be in
the future questions and problems not now envis-
ioned.
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